Mato Oput is a Cloak for Impunity in Northern Uganda (I)
End of conflicts must ensure human rights
The perception of whether justice has been served or injustices committed in the course of a war is a judgement that follows from two possible lines of assessment. First, opinions are formed on the general accounts of the conduct of the conflict and a verdict is passed. Second, we may choose to look at individual acts or events in the course of the war and give separate judgements of their just or unjust characteristics. Depending on the approach we adopt, it ought not to be an “either –or” judgement that glosses over complex and serious issues that demand careful considerations. Mato oput and partial ICC indictments of the LRA, suffer from such generalisation and limited focus to a truncated period of the conflict. It is partly for this reason that I would like to argue against mato oput - the Acholi traditional practice of conflict resolution -and the limited and selective ICC investigations and indictments, as suitable complementary models for war termination[1] in northern Uganda.
First, mato oput as a model for war termination makes no distinction between degree of gravity of crimes and categories of responsibility of perpetrators –abducted children, those who abducted, trained and deployed them and the crimes they committed. The principle of retributive justice demands that there must be proportionality; that is the punishment must be commensurate with the crime.
Second, war crimes, crime against humanity are committed against individuals as subjects of human rights discourses.[2] By overemphasising the fears, misery and psychological trauma of a collective, faceless, nameless mass of Acholi survivors and their wish for a quick fix, focus is removed from the necessity of exacting justice also for those who died horrible deaths because of abuses. Adopting this approach obscures the ultimate objective of war and war termination-the vindication of human rights by punishing unjustifiable abuses committed in the conduct and duration of the conflict.
Third, to have mato oput and supplemental state or ICC special courts that will try only alleged LRA perpetrators, biases the whole process of mato oput as a war termination model to favour the ethics of national security against ethics of human security.[3] In effect, we would not be punishing the LRA for crimes committed against northern Ugandan non-combatants, for which the NRA / UPDF are equally culpable, but for crimes against the Ugandan state. Therefore, mato oput as a war termination model that lays claims to justice and equity, would not be ensuring equal justice, but abetting a possible NRA / UPDF victor’s justice,[4] a justice girdled by political expediency.
It is a truism in the just war tradition that no peace can come out of an unjust war. And a just peace[5] cannot prevail if war termination rules are dictated by assumed victorious NRM/A which waged a war in violation of other’s rights in the first place. Lives, property and security have been destroyed through vindictive, politically motivated counterinsurgency strategies.[6] The defeat of violators or their punishment is the only means to vindicate those rights, and mato oput as a model, seems inadequate to make these transcending moral and political arguments. In ending the northern Uganda war, we must not only concern ourselves with what can be done but also what ought to be done,[7] a proposition that mato oput as a model for war termination is incapable of making. In other words, justice of the ends and justice of the means of war must be central to the contemplation of a just peace at the end of the northern Uganda war.
For a just peace to be concluded, judgements about motives of the war and how the war was conducted and ended are critical. The most important goal at the end of a conflict is the securing of human rights[8], and a just peace. On the scales of the principles of the just war tradition of Aquinas[9], Grotius,[10] Augustine[11] and their followers, both the LRA’s and the Uganda government’s motives and means used in prosecuting the northern war cannot be morally justified. This would still be the case even if we allowed for the accepted contradictions in the just war tradition that lives may have to be destroyed in order to save other lives; and that, sometimes destructive war is a necessary evil in the defence of certain values that constitute fundamental social and moral mainstay of society.
Our objection to mato oput and reservations about the ICC indictments of only the LRA as models for war termination and a just peace in northern Uganda, further rests on moral considerations that rely on two streams of thought in the just war tradition. These are (1) jus ad bellum, which is the period preceding entry into war, and (2) jus in bello, which is the succeeding period after entry into war. The moral justifications for war (jus ad bellum) deals with the legitimacy of authority, a just cause, a moral and just motive, and the choice of armed conflict as the least of a range of more devious options available to right a wrong or defend human rights. On the other hand, the moral justification for the means and conduct of war (jus in bello) concerns itself with the means used and the behaviour of combatants towards non-combatants and captured enemy combatants.[12] As Olara Otunna has so judiciously demonstrated, the incentives, behaviour and actions of the LRA insurgents and Ugandan state both, are indictable.
Are we better or worse off than we were before the war?
Under the purview of the just war tradition, a war of liberation or one fought in defence of human rights must not cause more harm, deaths and misery on the people in whose name it is fought. This is to ensure that no unjustifiable killings and abuses are perpetrated under the cover of a just war. As a key test for justice, in the course of the war or at the end of it, we must not be left worse off by the outcomes of the war than we were under prior and prevailing alleged unjust conditions the war sought to right. In the case of northern Uganda, there is no debate about how doubly worse off we are, and none of the belligerents on either side of the war comes out of this unscathed as vindicators of human rights. In other words, no persuasive case can be made, particularly in defence of the Ugandan state that war was the last resort and the least of several more devious and immoral courses of action that would have harmed more than protected social and economic infrastructures and the fundamental rights of the people who have suffered in northern and eastern Uganda.
To apply mato oput and partial ICC indictments to end the northern Uganda conflict and as a basis for a just peace, is tantamount to consciously promoting impunity and acquiescing in state-led propaganda that seeks to absolve the Ugandan state from responsibility to protect, and its own unjustifiable counterinsurgency strategies that like the LRA’s insurgency methods, victimised unarmed women and children; targeted entire ethnic group for collective punishment in order to discourage support for insurgency. We are familiar with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch documented cases of rape, sodomy, extrajudicial killings, forced displacements and forcible recruitment into both rebel and government paramilitaries and militias by both sides. It is not coincidental that the LRA and the Ugandan state both are strident proponents of mato oput; this is not because of any real possibility for truth-telling, but a means for escaping accountability and punishment for their criminal motives, behaviour and actions in the war.
Proponents of mato oput fail to appreciate the facts that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in northern Uganda centre around issues of the exercise of state power, human rights, and those who claim to have picked up arms to defend themselves or have challenged the legitimacy and powers of an unjust state.
Obviously, the state and human rights are subjects of both municipal law and public international law, but specifically, the individual is the subject of international humanitarian and human rights laws. Therefore, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are international crimes that must be subjected to the exigencies of international norms, justice and appropriate punishment without exception. The northern insurgency, which was originally organised around Acholi factions of ramparts of a former national army, was a contestation of state power and response to perceived persecution by the state[13]. Over the years, it permutated to co-opt regional and geopolitical dimensions of politics, ideology, natural resource economics and other aspects of strategic international calculation that had nothing to do with Acholi grievances or internal Uganda national politics. Consequently, its termination and equitable resolution cannot be adequately captured by Acholi traditional or cultural jurisprudence as a war termination model that ought to address outstanding grievances and issues in order for a just and durable peace to be established by the termination of the conflict.
In any case, the model of mato oput popularised by its varying local and international proponents, is a bastardised form and convoluted concept of classical Acholi mato oput. First, the practice was only relevant in inadvertent commission of grievous harm, manslaughter between families, clans, and villages, but never between Acholi and non-Acholi communities. Second, in classical Acholi practice, inter-tribal and inter-chiefdom conflicts, killings and grievances were evaluated on lapii or casas belli, which gave rise to a just ad bellum or the moral justification for a war of revenge. The defeat of or suit for peace by the perpetrators, leading to culu kwor or proportionate indemnity or punishment, led to a settlement that ended with gomo tong or bending of spears by both sides to signify conflict termination, but never mato oput, which was inter-family, inter-clan and an intra-Acholi practice for accidental harm. Therefore, the LRM / A and the NRM/A conflict as deliberate acts of abuses does not qualify for mato oput; and its assumed social, psychological and metaphysical potency could not be thought to be of any value in remediation of rights abuses including unjustified killings in or outside Acholi. In other words, mato oput is a poor substitute for a robust, aggressive and vigorous application of international humanitarian and human rights laws to vindicate the human rights of the people of northern Uganda and provide a basis for a just peace.
For the purpose of our arguments, we consider mato oput without any practical merits in extra-Acholi conflict context. Despite its moral relativism, the practice has attracted strident interlocutors, some with compassionate merits, but most with indefensible positions relying on faith, speculation and deliberate unwillingness to look at the history and facts of the conflicts to inform the best framework for termination and a just peace.
[1] For further readings on war termination, see Pillar, Paul R. (1988) Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Taylor, A.J.P. (1985) How Wars End. London. H. Hamilton; Walter, B.F. ((2002) Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Licklider, R. ed., (1993) Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End. New York: New York University Press; Zartman, I.W. (1995) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press; Doyle M.W., and Sambanis, N. (1995) International Peace building: a theoretical and quantitative analysis. American Political Science Review, 94(4), pp. 779-801; and Licklider, R. (1995) The Consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945-1993. American Political Science Review, 89 (3).
[2] Waltzer, Michael. (2000) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 3rd edition. New York: Basic Books; Lauren, Paul Gordon. (2003) The Evoloution of International Human Rights. 2nd edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; and Ball, Howard. (1999) Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide: The Twentieth Century Experience. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
[3] Smith, Michael Joseph. (1997). Growing Up with Just and Unjust Wars: An Appreciation. Ethics and International Affairs 11:3-18; Waltzer, Michael. (2000) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 3rd edition. New York: Basic Books.
[4] Kecskemeti, Paul. (1958) Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
[5] On the concept and conditions for a just peace, see Allan, Pierre, and Alexis Keller, eds. (2006). What is a Just Peace? New York: Oxford University Press; and also Lasiello, Louis V. (2004) Jus Post Bellum. The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War. Naval War College Review 57: 33-52.; Waltzer, Michael. (2000) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 3rd edition. New York: Basic Books; and Orend, Brian. (2002) Justice After War. Ethics and International Affairs 16:43-56.
[6] Otunnu, Olara A. (2006) The Secret Genocide. Foreign Policy. July / August.
[7] Kegley, Charles W., JR., and Gregory A. Raymond. (1999) How Nations Make Peace. New York: St. Martin’s / Worth; For further readings on war termination, see Pillar, Paul R. (1988) Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Taylor, A.J.P. (1985) How Wars End. London. H. Hamilton; Walter, B.F. ((2002) Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Licklider, R. ed., (1993) Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End. New York: New York University Press; Zartman, I.W. (1995) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press; Doyle M.W., and Sambanis, N. (1995) International Peace building: a theoretical and quantitative analysis. American Political Science Review, 94(4), pp. 779-801; and Licklider, R. (1995) The Consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945-1993. American Political Science Review, 89 (3).
[8] Lauren, Paul Gordon. (2003) The Evolution of International Human Rights, 2nd edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
[9] Aquinas, Thomas. (1916) The Summa Theologia of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne,Ltd.
[10] Grotius, Hugo. (1949) The Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacis). Translated by Louise R. Loomis. Roslyn: Walter J. Black, Inc.
[11] Augustine. (1958) The City of God. Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Demtrius B. Zema, Grace Monahan, and Daniel J. Honan. Garden City: Image Books.
[12] Johnson, James Turner. (1975) Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740. Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Childress,James F. (1982) Moral Responsibility in Conflict: Essays on Nonviolence, War and Conscience. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
[13] For a history of the northern Uganda insurgency, see for instance Lamwaka, Caroline; O’kadamerie, Billie; and Otunnu, Ogenga, in Lucima, Okello ed. (2002) Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda. Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives. Issue 11. London: CR and KM.
The perception of whether justice has been served or injustices committed in the course of a war is a judgement that follows from two possible lines of assessment. First, opinions are formed on the general accounts of the conduct of the conflict and a verdict is passed. Second, we may choose to look at individual acts or events in the course of the war and give separate judgements of their just or unjust characteristics. Depending on the approach we adopt, it ought not to be an “either –or” judgement that glosses over complex and serious issues that demand careful considerations. Mato oput and partial ICC indictments of the LRA, suffer from such generalisation and limited focus to a truncated period of the conflict. It is partly for this reason that I would like to argue against mato oput - the Acholi traditional practice of conflict resolution -and the limited and selective ICC investigations and indictments, as suitable complementary models for war termination[1] in northern Uganda.
First, mato oput as a model for war termination makes no distinction between degree of gravity of crimes and categories of responsibility of perpetrators –abducted children, those who abducted, trained and deployed them and the crimes they committed. The principle of retributive justice demands that there must be proportionality; that is the punishment must be commensurate with the crime.
Second, war crimes, crime against humanity are committed against individuals as subjects of human rights discourses.[2] By overemphasising the fears, misery and psychological trauma of a collective, faceless, nameless mass of Acholi survivors and their wish for a quick fix, focus is removed from the necessity of exacting justice also for those who died horrible deaths because of abuses. Adopting this approach obscures the ultimate objective of war and war termination-the vindication of human rights by punishing unjustifiable abuses committed in the conduct and duration of the conflict.
Third, to have mato oput and supplemental state or ICC special courts that will try only alleged LRA perpetrators, biases the whole process of mato oput as a war termination model to favour the ethics of national security against ethics of human security.[3] In effect, we would not be punishing the LRA for crimes committed against northern Ugandan non-combatants, for which the NRA / UPDF are equally culpable, but for crimes against the Ugandan state. Therefore, mato oput as a war termination model that lays claims to justice and equity, would not be ensuring equal justice, but abetting a possible NRA / UPDF victor’s justice,[4] a justice girdled by political expediency.
It is a truism in the just war tradition that no peace can come out of an unjust war. And a just peace[5] cannot prevail if war termination rules are dictated by assumed victorious NRM/A which waged a war in violation of other’s rights in the first place. Lives, property and security have been destroyed through vindictive, politically motivated counterinsurgency strategies.[6] The defeat of violators or their punishment is the only means to vindicate those rights, and mato oput as a model, seems inadequate to make these transcending moral and political arguments. In ending the northern Uganda war, we must not only concern ourselves with what can be done but also what ought to be done,[7] a proposition that mato oput as a model for war termination is incapable of making. In other words, justice of the ends and justice of the means of war must be central to the contemplation of a just peace at the end of the northern Uganda war.
For a just peace to be concluded, judgements about motives of the war and how the war was conducted and ended are critical. The most important goal at the end of a conflict is the securing of human rights[8], and a just peace. On the scales of the principles of the just war tradition of Aquinas[9], Grotius,[10] Augustine[11] and their followers, both the LRA’s and the Uganda government’s motives and means used in prosecuting the northern war cannot be morally justified. This would still be the case even if we allowed for the accepted contradictions in the just war tradition that lives may have to be destroyed in order to save other lives; and that, sometimes destructive war is a necessary evil in the defence of certain values that constitute fundamental social and moral mainstay of society.
Our objection to mato oput and reservations about the ICC indictments of only the LRA as models for war termination and a just peace in northern Uganda, further rests on moral considerations that rely on two streams of thought in the just war tradition. These are (1) jus ad bellum, which is the period preceding entry into war, and (2) jus in bello, which is the succeeding period after entry into war. The moral justifications for war (jus ad bellum) deals with the legitimacy of authority, a just cause, a moral and just motive, and the choice of armed conflict as the least of a range of more devious options available to right a wrong or defend human rights. On the other hand, the moral justification for the means and conduct of war (jus in bello) concerns itself with the means used and the behaviour of combatants towards non-combatants and captured enemy combatants.[12] As Olara Otunna has so judiciously demonstrated, the incentives, behaviour and actions of the LRA insurgents and Ugandan state both, are indictable.
Are we better or worse off than we were before the war?
Under the purview of the just war tradition, a war of liberation or one fought in defence of human rights must not cause more harm, deaths and misery on the people in whose name it is fought. This is to ensure that no unjustifiable killings and abuses are perpetrated under the cover of a just war. As a key test for justice, in the course of the war or at the end of it, we must not be left worse off by the outcomes of the war than we were under prior and prevailing alleged unjust conditions the war sought to right. In the case of northern Uganda, there is no debate about how doubly worse off we are, and none of the belligerents on either side of the war comes out of this unscathed as vindicators of human rights. In other words, no persuasive case can be made, particularly in defence of the Ugandan state that war was the last resort and the least of several more devious and immoral courses of action that would have harmed more than protected social and economic infrastructures and the fundamental rights of the people who have suffered in northern and eastern Uganda.
To apply mato oput and partial ICC indictments to end the northern Uganda conflict and as a basis for a just peace, is tantamount to consciously promoting impunity and acquiescing in state-led propaganda that seeks to absolve the Ugandan state from responsibility to protect, and its own unjustifiable counterinsurgency strategies that like the LRA’s insurgency methods, victimised unarmed women and children; targeted entire ethnic group for collective punishment in order to discourage support for insurgency. We are familiar with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch documented cases of rape, sodomy, extrajudicial killings, forced displacements and forcible recruitment into both rebel and government paramilitaries and militias by both sides. It is not coincidental that the LRA and the Ugandan state both are strident proponents of mato oput; this is not because of any real possibility for truth-telling, but a means for escaping accountability and punishment for their criminal motives, behaviour and actions in the war.
Proponents of mato oput fail to appreciate the facts that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in northern Uganda centre around issues of the exercise of state power, human rights, and those who claim to have picked up arms to defend themselves or have challenged the legitimacy and powers of an unjust state.
Obviously, the state and human rights are subjects of both municipal law and public international law, but specifically, the individual is the subject of international humanitarian and human rights laws. Therefore, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are international crimes that must be subjected to the exigencies of international norms, justice and appropriate punishment without exception. The northern insurgency, which was originally organised around Acholi factions of ramparts of a former national army, was a contestation of state power and response to perceived persecution by the state[13]. Over the years, it permutated to co-opt regional and geopolitical dimensions of politics, ideology, natural resource economics and other aspects of strategic international calculation that had nothing to do with Acholi grievances or internal Uganda national politics. Consequently, its termination and equitable resolution cannot be adequately captured by Acholi traditional or cultural jurisprudence as a war termination model that ought to address outstanding grievances and issues in order for a just and durable peace to be established by the termination of the conflict.
In any case, the model of mato oput popularised by its varying local and international proponents, is a bastardised form and convoluted concept of classical Acholi mato oput. First, the practice was only relevant in inadvertent commission of grievous harm, manslaughter between families, clans, and villages, but never between Acholi and non-Acholi communities. Second, in classical Acholi practice, inter-tribal and inter-chiefdom conflicts, killings and grievances were evaluated on lapii or casas belli, which gave rise to a just ad bellum or the moral justification for a war of revenge. The defeat of or suit for peace by the perpetrators, leading to culu kwor or proportionate indemnity or punishment, led to a settlement that ended with gomo tong or bending of spears by both sides to signify conflict termination, but never mato oput, which was inter-family, inter-clan and an intra-Acholi practice for accidental harm. Therefore, the LRM / A and the NRM/A conflict as deliberate acts of abuses does not qualify for mato oput; and its assumed social, psychological and metaphysical potency could not be thought to be of any value in remediation of rights abuses including unjustified killings in or outside Acholi. In other words, mato oput is a poor substitute for a robust, aggressive and vigorous application of international humanitarian and human rights laws to vindicate the human rights of the people of northern Uganda and provide a basis for a just peace.
For the purpose of our arguments, we consider mato oput without any practical merits in extra-Acholi conflict context. Despite its moral relativism, the practice has attracted strident interlocutors, some with compassionate merits, but most with indefensible positions relying on faith, speculation and deliberate unwillingness to look at the history and facts of the conflicts to inform the best framework for termination and a just peace.
[1] For further readings on war termination, see Pillar, Paul R. (1988) Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Taylor, A.J.P. (1985) How Wars End. London. H. Hamilton; Walter, B.F. ((2002) Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Licklider, R. ed., (1993) Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End. New York: New York University Press; Zartman, I.W. (1995) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press; Doyle M.W., and Sambanis, N. (1995) International Peace building: a theoretical and quantitative analysis. American Political Science Review, 94(4), pp. 779-801; and Licklider, R. (1995) The Consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945-1993. American Political Science Review, 89 (3).
[2] Waltzer, Michael. (2000) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 3rd edition. New York: Basic Books; Lauren, Paul Gordon. (2003) The Evoloution of International Human Rights. 2nd edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; and Ball, Howard. (1999) Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide: The Twentieth Century Experience. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
[3] Smith, Michael Joseph. (1997). Growing Up with Just and Unjust Wars: An Appreciation. Ethics and International Affairs 11:3-18; Waltzer, Michael. (2000) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 3rd edition. New York: Basic Books.
[4] Kecskemeti, Paul. (1958) Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
[5] On the concept and conditions for a just peace, see Allan, Pierre, and Alexis Keller, eds. (2006). What is a Just Peace? New York: Oxford University Press; and also Lasiello, Louis V. (2004) Jus Post Bellum. The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War. Naval War College Review 57: 33-52.; Waltzer, Michael. (2000) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 3rd edition. New York: Basic Books; and Orend, Brian. (2002) Justice After War. Ethics and International Affairs 16:43-56.
[6] Otunnu, Olara A. (2006) The Secret Genocide. Foreign Policy. July / August.
[7] Kegley, Charles W., JR., and Gregory A. Raymond. (1999) How Nations Make Peace. New York: St. Martin’s / Worth; For further readings on war termination, see Pillar, Paul R. (1988) Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Taylor, A.J.P. (1985) How Wars End. London. H. Hamilton; Walter, B.F. ((2002) Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Licklider, R. ed., (1993) Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End. New York: New York University Press; Zartman, I.W. (1995) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press; Doyle M.W., and Sambanis, N. (1995) International Peace building: a theoretical and quantitative analysis. American Political Science Review, 94(4), pp. 779-801; and Licklider, R. (1995) The Consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945-1993. American Political Science Review, 89 (3).
[8] Lauren, Paul Gordon. (2003) The Evolution of International Human Rights, 2nd edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
[9] Aquinas, Thomas. (1916) The Summa Theologia of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne,Ltd.
[10] Grotius, Hugo. (1949) The Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacis). Translated by Louise R. Loomis. Roslyn: Walter J. Black, Inc.
[11] Augustine. (1958) The City of God. Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Demtrius B. Zema, Grace Monahan, and Daniel J. Honan. Garden City: Image Books.
[12] Johnson, James Turner. (1975) Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740. Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Childress,James F. (1982) Moral Responsibility in Conflict: Essays on Nonviolence, War and Conscience. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
[13] For a history of the northern Uganda insurgency, see for instance Lamwaka, Caroline; O’kadamerie, Billie; and Otunnu, Ogenga, in Lucima, Okello ed. (2002) Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda. Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives. Issue 11. London: CR and KM.
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