Social inequalities and the problems of leadership in Acholi (Recaps
The individual, rational choice, elite politics and the erosion of ethnic bonds.
In my previous musings, I indicated that the scramble for land in Acholi is the result of class conflict and the struggle for political power by elite groups. This involves the national elite allied to the state, with easy access to political power and resources, in alliance with their friends and class ideologues in Acholi on the one hand (national resistance movement, ie NRM & Co). On the other hand, we got another section of the Acholi middle class and political elite, outside of the ruling party but affiliated with opposition politics, articulating national democratic positions and seemingly committing class suicide by championing the rights of the poor and marginalized (Acholi parliamentary Group, ie APG & Co).
I drew the attention of the reader to the fact that under normal circumstances, both of these elite fractions belong to the same social and economic class, and would all strive to maximise their class advantage in seeking to accumulate wealth through access to political power and commodity production. Moreover, the differences between the two class fractions over the issue of land in Acholi is not based on fundamental, diametrically opposed or competing normative social and political values. But rather, by the historical moment of genocide and deprivation in northern Uganda, which predisposes it as a hotbed to a radical strain of populist politics and activism.
Therefore, in normative social, political and economic terms (ideologically), the elite coalition symbolised by the APG and a section of Acholi Diaspora is as neoliberal as those represented by Hilary Onek or Omara Atubo. As a matter of emphasis and re-statement of their positions, neoliberalism centres its moral focus on the individual as the fundamental element around which society and the state are organised. It believes in the effectiveness and efficiency of the market to distribute material and moral goods and rewards, and to guarantee the independence of the individual. Furthermore, neoliberals would favour a minimal state that interferes neither with the independence of the market nor the autonomy of the individual. Embedded within such socio-political and economic beliefs and thought, both the APG and the state proponents support and welcome foreign and private investments, the market as an impartial, efficient and effective arbiter, and the individual as its best subject.
In terms politics and policy, what separates the opposition fraction from the state ideologues is the issue of timing, rather than policy values and direction. And that the elite allied to the ruling party and state power are comparatively more affluent, having benefited from state economic divestiture, liberalisation and privatisation policies that gave them control and ownership of state assets without investing any liquid capital of their own. This gives them access to greater political power and material resources, and with it the ability to accumulate more on a greater scale and thereby threaten the livelihoods of the poor and disadvantage those marginalised by state politics of exclusion. In return for such privileges, they are to give blind, unflinching, obsequious allegiance to Yorweri Museveni and the ruling party.
Based on these observations of elite politics and social conreadictions in Acholi, I followed the analysis with a look at the agencies of social change in Acholi. I noted that westernisation, in the form of the embracing of western religious faith, education and cultural values and lifestyles, have had remarkable impact in the emergence of a vibrant Acholi middle class both at home and in the diaspora that would be unrecognisable in Paibona or Madi Opei. I observed that, while individually, the elements of these social and economic groups are still attached to place (Acholiland or clan), increasingly these traditional moral references are becoming remote and only invoked to facilitate greater access and accumulation, or to seek advantage or exclusion.
As individuals, the members of these social and economic classes think more in economic terms than as members of an ethnic group. Based on that observation, I cautioned that it would be futile to think of ethnic cohesion and solidarity as an article of faith, when economic considerations and individual aspirations are emerging as the most important influences in making political, social and moral choices. Therefore, to speak of or call for Acholi unity without recognising social differentiation and inequalities with their respective interests that have emerged and characterise Acholi today, would be to engage in abstraction, but not to visualise and confront a society that exists in time and place with all its salient social, economic, political and ideological fissures. These are reasons why we are bewildered to find that we are unable to unify Acholi voices on land policy, the need for peace and other important issues of collective concerns.
I pointed out that we need to recognise and understand the changes that have taken place and seek to build coalition and alliances across social groupings in order to push through progressive social, economic and political reforms with potential for greater good for the majority of our disadvantaged population. But we cannot do this by taking ethnic solidarity for granted. It may be time to think more in terms of class and social group rather than ethnicity or locality, if we hope to achieve equality and social justice for the poor and marginalised. Ethnicity cannot therefore be the right vehicle. What is needed is a group of progressive thinkers and action-oriented Acholi to constitute a programme of action and push it through in the name of the majority, regardlenss of what some of the elite groups think. we must be willing to fight a war of ideas and let the progressive faction be able to defeat, dominate, control and make its opponents serve its interests. So far, all we have done is invoke ethnicity and hope the rest take care of itslef. A mob cannot lead; it follows the will of leaders that speak to their needs and interests and have a vision for making that a reality.
The failure or unwillingness to recognise the diminishing usefulness or narrow appeal of ethnic identity and loyalties, and the rising importance of individualism and economic and class interests, is a critical source of leadership problems in Acholi. The problems of leadership in Acholi are directly linked to issues of social inequalities, class and historical elite competition. To understand this, we will outline historical and social processes and mechanisms and how they created particular social and economic classes in Acholi from the advent of colonialism to the present. These were British colonial rule; missionary education; the removal of Acholi traditional chiefs and their replacement with rwodi kalam; the Second World War and anti-colonial politics, and post independence political upheavals, the creation of Acholi diasporas and the restoration of traditional chiefs who feel they must lead by traditional rights.
Where is the centre of power in Acholi that must give its leaders legitimacy? Is it traditional and cultural rights, or liberal democratic rights and civic citizenship within the Ugandan nationa-state?
We will try to answer these and other questions in the next instalments on elite formation, social inequalities, the creation of social and political family dynasties in Acholi, and how these affect Acholi unity and leadership today-both at home and in the diaspora.
In my previous musings, I indicated that the scramble for land in Acholi is the result of class conflict and the struggle for political power by elite groups. This involves the national elite allied to the state, with easy access to political power and resources, in alliance with their friends and class ideologues in Acholi on the one hand (national resistance movement, ie NRM & Co). On the other hand, we got another section of the Acholi middle class and political elite, outside of the ruling party but affiliated with opposition politics, articulating national democratic positions and seemingly committing class suicide by championing the rights of the poor and marginalized (Acholi parliamentary Group, ie APG & Co).
I drew the attention of the reader to the fact that under normal circumstances, both of these elite fractions belong to the same social and economic class, and would all strive to maximise their class advantage in seeking to accumulate wealth through access to political power and commodity production. Moreover, the differences between the two class fractions over the issue of land in Acholi is not based on fundamental, diametrically opposed or competing normative social and political values. But rather, by the historical moment of genocide and deprivation in northern Uganda, which predisposes it as a hotbed to a radical strain of populist politics and activism.
Therefore, in normative social, political and economic terms (ideologically), the elite coalition symbolised by the APG and a section of Acholi Diaspora is as neoliberal as those represented by Hilary Onek or Omara Atubo. As a matter of emphasis and re-statement of their positions, neoliberalism centres its moral focus on the individual as the fundamental element around which society and the state are organised. It believes in the effectiveness and efficiency of the market to distribute material and moral goods and rewards, and to guarantee the independence of the individual. Furthermore, neoliberals would favour a minimal state that interferes neither with the independence of the market nor the autonomy of the individual. Embedded within such socio-political and economic beliefs and thought, both the APG and the state proponents support and welcome foreign and private investments, the market as an impartial, efficient and effective arbiter, and the individual as its best subject.
In terms politics and policy, what separates the opposition fraction from the state ideologues is the issue of timing, rather than policy values and direction. And that the elite allied to the ruling party and state power are comparatively more affluent, having benefited from state economic divestiture, liberalisation and privatisation policies that gave them control and ownership of state assets without investing any liquid capital of their own. This gives them access to greater political power and material resources, and with it the ability to accumulate more on a greater scale and thereby threaten the livelihoods of the poor and disadvantage those marginalised by state politics of exclusion. In return for such privileges, they are to give blind, unflinching, obsequious allegiance to Yorweri Museveni and the ruling party.
Based on these observations of elite politics and social conreadictions in Acholi, I followed the analysis with a look at the agencies of social change in Acholi. I noted that westernisation, in the form of the embracing of western religious faith, education and cultural values and lifestyles, have had remarkable impact in the emergence of a vibrant Acholi middle class both at home and in the diaspora that would be unrecognisable in Paibona or Madi Opei. I observed that, while individually, the elements of these social and economic groups are still attached to place (Acholiland or clan), increasingly these traditional moral references are becoming remote and only invoked to facilitate greater access and accumulation, or to seek advantage or exclusion.
As individuals, the members of these social and economic classes think more in economic terms than as members of an ethnic group. Based on that observation, I cautioned that it would be futile to think of ethnic cohesion and solidarity as an article of faith, when economic considerations and individual aspirations are emerging as the most important influences in making political, social and moral choices. Therefore, to speak of or call for Acholi unity without recognising social differentiation and inequalities with their respective interests that have emerged and characterise Acholi today, would be to engage in abstraction, but not to visualise and confront a society that exists in time and place with all its salient social, economic, political and ideological fissures. These are reasons why we are bewildered to find that we are unable to unify Acholi voices on land policy, the need for peace and other important issues of collective concerns.
I pointed out that we need to recognise and understand the changes that have taken place and seek to build coalition and alliances across social groupings in order to push through progressive social, economic and political reforms with potential for greater good for the majority of our disadvantaged population. But we cannot do this by taking ethnic solidarity for granted. It may be time to think more in terms of class and social group rather than ethnicity or locality, if we hope to achieve equality and social justice for the poor and marginalised. Ethnicity cannot therefore be the right vehicle. What is needed is a group of progressive thinkers and action-oriented Acholi to constitute a programme of action and push it through in the name of the majority, regardlenss of what some of the elite groups think. we must be willing to fight a war of ideas and let the progressive faction be able to defeat, dominate, control and make its opponents serve its interests. So far, all we have done is invoke ethnicity and hope the rest take care of itslef. A mob cannot lead; it follows the will of leaders that speak to their needs and interests and have a vision for making that a reality.
The failure or unwillingness to recognise the diminishing usefulness or narrow appeal of ethnic identity and loyalties, and the rising importance of individualism and economic and class interests, is a critical source of leadership problems in Acholi. The problems of leadership in Acholi are directly linked to issues of social inequalities, class and historical elite competition. To understand this, we will outline historical and social processes and mechanisms and how they created particular social and economic classes in Acholi from the advent of colonialism to the present. These were British colonial rule; missionary education; the removal of Acholi traditional chiefs and their replacement with rwodi kalam; the Second World War and anti-colonial politics, and post independence political upheavals, the creation of Acholi diasporas and the restoration of traditional chiefs who feel they must lead by traditional rights.
Where is the centre of power in Acholi that must give its leaders legitimacy? Is it traditional and cultural rights, or liberal democratic rights and civic citizenship within the Ugandan nationa-state?
We will try to answer these and other questions in the next instalments on elite formation, social inequalities, the creation of social and political family dynasties in Acholi, and how these affect Acholi unity and leadership today-both at home and in the diaspora.
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