The historical and social bases of problems of leadership among Acholi of Uganda, Part IV
The US, Britain and Europe: Imperialist Competition to Own and control peace Initiatives and processes in northern Uganda
The moderate, democratic and liberal coalition at KM (which included progressives from the old Acholi establishment as well as radical groups) found itself under siege from an army of critics. Detracted and mired in defending and trying to justify itself, KM was paralysed and left with self-doubts, despite the overwhelming support of the majority of Acholi people at home and a critical mass in the diaspora. KM's critical problem was that it sought to be the voice of the Acholi people and for every Acholi to have a stake in its work. Therefore, rather than deal with a critical mass, KM sought unanimity or at worst consensus, which was something difficult to achieve, given the stratification and aspirations of the social dynasties outlined above. But unable to completely undermine and discredit KM, they either directly or through malleable proxies founded new organisations to directly compete with KM or any other organisation outside their control. For a short period, Friends for Peace in Africa (FPA) seemed the best tool to use to undermine KM. But soon, the proponents of old style Acholi politics found out that, although it had " Africa" in its name, FPA was not very fundamentally different from KM, and it was not anti-KM and its focus was also with the Acholi genocide. Once it became clear that they could not control the agenda or lead, they abandoned FPA like rats escaping from a burning hut. As expected, FPA too, was declared illegitimate Acholi representative or voice. Henceforth, ad-hoc individual groupings and elite networks, rather than a formal organisation, would do the trick.
The spawning of new organisations and informal elite networks reflected the social divisions that characterise Acholi society. It also denoted that there was no one group strong enough socially, politically and ideologically to use its critical mass to impose its will and programmes over the Acholi social, political and ideological landscape. Although KM came close to becoming such an organisation, its coalitional nature handicapped it in trying to play a neutral role, or as it puts it, non-partisan. Furthermore, it made the mistake of taking its non-partisan attitude to the point of absurdity, by painting itself into the middle and trying to mediate between the LRM/A and the NRM / A government, rather than articulating an Acholi position that puts demands on both the LRM and NRM for the genocide and Acholi rights. But the important point we want to make here is that organisations like KM and FPA to a point were undermined by the fact that most of the old style Acholi dynastic elements were shut out of the decision-making process and they decided to have nothing to do with it. Simplistically, it was that if they could not lead or play influential roles, then it could not be a legitimate Acholi entity, representing Acholi interests. This is the crux of what people generally say there is no Acholi leadership; because it is outside the vested interests of old style dynastic factions whose role has diminished significantly.
The loss of influence of the old style social and political family dynasties meant that their roles in democratic Acholi organisations will always be marginal. As a result, they adopted a rapprochement with the state and opted for direct contact and representation as individuals or group of individuals rather than through a formal organisation. Unable to exert significant influences and control over political processes in the diaspora and at home, they have turned their attention to the economy, where their command of comparable economic resources can be put to use in controlling economic interests and activities in Acholi and \nUganda. Real estate, land, construction, communications, and district tenders and contracts, are some of the economic activities they are engaged in. Politically, they have moved closer to support the regime in power and ally with the in-country Acholi elite of the ruling party.
These changing and competing orientations among elite have opened up new frontiers for destabilising any emergent Acholi initiatives or leadership. For now, there is the external element involving foreign interests that may even be hostile to Acholi needs. Since KM2000, Acholi diaspora splintered into three major geopolitical regions. These were North America, Europe and \nBritain. But Canada was split in the middle; one half allied to the US, while another half looked towards the UK and the European elite for hope.
In North America, USAID and the State Department started throwing their weight behind US based diaspora elite and organisations, after the Carter Centre lost its grip at the head of the Uganda Peace Process. In Europe, individual Scandinavian governments supported initiatives by European based elite through their development arms like DANIDA and SIDA.
KM continued to draw support from Britain through DFID, and other European members of the EU to aid its various activities and partnerships with the traditional leaders and ARLPI. Such differences and competition also opened up the diaspora elite and Acholi generally to the manipulations of capital and imperialist competition. This was best demonstrated by the creation of Northern Uganda Peace Initiatives (NUPI) by the US, against the British and European supported processes through established Acholi organisations and partnerships of KM, ARLPI, APG, Traditional Leaders, and CR.
As Uganda's top diplomatic benefactor, the US did not want to be marginalised in northern Uganda. Therefore, elite competition has played into the hands of imperialist interests, which has only worked to subvert Acholicentric dispositions. The tragedy is that, all these Acholi elite groupings, even when they profess solidarity, where project money is involved, they act independently without consulting, collectively evaluating the impact of such projects and actions on Acholi's immediate or long term interests. And various competing interests have taken advantage of this segmentation and lack of cohesion to alienate one group from the other, deal with it independently and isolate other groups and partners. As a result, consensus on a particular organisation or authority of leadership on issues of common concerns has been difficult to achieve.
Conclusion
I have contented that the landmarks of the erosion of the power and influence of the old Acholi social and political dynasties was their failure to exert control and provide leadership for Acholi diaspora, their various organisations, and particularly what I consider their defeat at KM97. The problem of Acholi leadership, is therefore, the problem of various social groups, particularly the heirs to the old family dynastic politics, fighting for influence and control over Acholi agenda. It is also the problem of the difficulty of creating a coalition of these various groups to work together. The difficulty is that no organisation will be considered legitimate unless it gives leading members of such social groups, leadership role and influence comparable to their assumed historical social status and recognition. This is particularly when ethnicity is used to define and limit our need and aspirations. We believe therefore, the solution lies in a progressive faction emerging, that is not shy to articulate and organise on the basis of ideas and envisioning of a future that seeks to promote the interests of the most vulnerable of our society. Therefore, they should be able to understand competing interests but bold enough to challenge and defeat those that only benefit minority social groups, economic classes or protect arbitrary traditional, cultural and other privileges.
I have laboured to elaborate on the social and historical bases of leadership problems in Acholi. I have indicated that these problems arose from social inequalities in our history and its continuing impacts on social differentiations and elite politics in Acholi and the diaspora. I have pointed out that social groups and leadership that derived from colonial political patronage and traditional privileges have been displaced and their influence diminished by a rising liberal and democratic middle class that has emerged as a result of the expansion of educational opportunity and corresponding affluence, after independence, and by flight and exile after 1986.
The moderate, democratic and liberal coalition at KM (which included progressives from the old Acholi establishment as well as radical groups) found itself under siege from an army of critics. Detracted and mired in defending and trying to justify itself, KM was paralysed and left with self-doubts, despite the overwhelming support of the majority of Acholi people at home and a critical mass in the diaspora. KM's critical problem was that it sought to be the voice of the Acholi people and for every Acholi to have a stake in its work. Therefore, rather than deal with a critical mass, KM sought unanimity or at worst consensus, which was something difficult to achieve, given the stratification and aspirations of the social dynasties outlined above. But unable to completely undermine and discredit KM, they either directly or through malleable proxies founded new organisations to directly compete with KM or any other organisation outside their control. For a short period, Friends for Peace in Africa (FPA) seemed the best tool to use to undermine KM. But soon, the proponents of old style Acholi politics found out that, although it had " Africa" in its name, FPA was not very fundamentally different from KM, and it was not anti-KM and its focus was also with the Acholi genocide. Once it became clear that they could not control the agenda or lead, they abandoned FPA like rats escaping from a burning hut. As expected, FPA too, was declared illegitimate Acholi representative or voice. Henceforth, ad-hoc individual groupings and elite networks, rather than a formal organisation, would do the trick.
The spawning of new organisations and informal elite networks reflected the social divisions that characterise Acholi society. It also denoted that there was no one group strong enough socially, politically and ideologically to use its critical mass to impose its will and programmes over the Acholi social, political and ideological landscape. Although KM came close to becoming such an organisation, its coalitional nature handicapped it in trying to play a neutral role, or as it puts it, non-partisan. Furthermore, it made the mistake of taking its non-partisan attitude to the point of absurdity, by painting itself into the middle and trying to mediate between the LRM/A and the NRM / A government, rather than articulating an Acholi position that puts demands on both the LRM and NRM for the genocide and Acholi rights. But the important point we want to make here is that organisations like KM and FPA to a point were undermined by the fact that most of the old style Acholi dynastic elements were shut out of the decision-making process and they decided to have nothing to do with it. Simplistically, it was that if they could not lead or play influential roles, then it could not be a legitimate Acholi entity, representing Acholi interests. This is the crux of what people generally say there is no Acholi leadership; because it is outside the vested interests of old style dynastic factions whose role has diminished significantly.
The loss of influence of the old style social and political family dynasties meant that their roles in democratic Acholi organisations will always be marginal. As a result, they adopted a rapprochement with the state and opted for direct contact and representation as individuals or group of individuals rather than through a formal organisation. Unable to exert significant influences and control over political processes in the diaspora and at home, they have turned their attention to the economy, where their command of comparable economic resources can be put to use in controlling economic interests and activities in Acholi and \nUganda. Real estate, land, construction, communications, and district tenders and contracts, are some of the economic activities they are engaged in. Politically, they have moved closer to support the regime in power and ally with the in-country Acholi elite of the ruling party.
These changing and competing orientations among elite have opened up new frontiers for destabilising any emergent Acholi initiatives or leadership. For now, there is the external element involving foreign interests that may even be hostile to Acholi needs. Since KM2000, Acholi diaspora splintered into three major geopolitical regions. These were North America, Europe and \nBritain. But Canada was split in the middle; one half allied to the US, while another half looked towards the UK and the European elite for hope.
In North America, USAID and the State Department started throwing their weight behind US based diaspora elite and organisations, after the Carter Centre lost its grip at the head of the Uganda Peace Process. In Europe, individual Scandinavian governments supported initiatives by European based elite through their development arms like DANIDA and SIDA.
KM continued to draw support from Britain through DFID, and other European members of the EU to aid its various activities and partnerships with the traditional leaders and ARLPI. Such differences and competition also opened up the diaspora elite and Acholi generally to the manipulations of capital and imperialist competition. This was best demonstrated by the creation of Northern Uganda Peace Initiatives (NUPI) by the US, against the British and European supported processes through established Acholi organisations and partnerships of KM, ARLPI, APG, Traditional Leaders, and CR.
As Uganda's top diplomatic benefactor, the US did not want to be marginalised in northern Uganda. Therefore, elite competition has played into the hands of imperialist interests, which has only worked to subvert Acholicentric dispositions. The tragedy is that, all these Acholi elite groupings, even when they profess solidarity, where project money is involved, they act independently without consulting, collectively evaluating the impact of such projects and actions on Acholi's immediate or long term interests. And various competing interests have taken advantage of this segmentation and lack of cohesion to alienate one group from the other, deal with it independently and isolate other groups and partners. As a result, consensus on a particular organisation or authority of leadership on issues of common concerns has been difficult to achieve.
Conclusion
I have contented that the landmarks of the erosion of the power and influence of the old Acholi social and political dynasties was their failure to exert control and provide leadership for Acholi diaspora, their various organisations, and particularly what I consider their defeat at KM97. The problem of Acholi leadership, is therefore, the problem of various social groups, particularly the heirs to the old family dynastic politics, fighting for influence and control over Acholi agenda. It is also the problem of the difficulty of creating a coalition of these various groups to work together. The difficulty is that no organisation will be considered legitimate unless it gives leading members of such social groups, leadership role and influence comparable to their assumed historical social status and recognition. This is particularly when ethnicity is used to define and limit our need and aspirations. We believe therefore, the solution lies in a progressive faction emerging, that is not shy to articulate and organise on the basis of ideas and envisioning of a future that seeks to promote the interests of the most vulnerable of our society. Therefore, they should be able to understand competing interests but bold enough to challenge and defeat those that only benefit minority social groups, economic classes or protect arbitrary traditional, cultural and other privileges.
I have laboured to elaborate on the social and historical bases of leadership problems in Acholi. I have indicated that these problems arose from social inequalities in our history and its continuing impacts on social differentiations and elite politics in Acholi and the diaspora. I have pointed out that social groups and leadership that derived from colonial political patronage and traditional privileges have been displaced and their influence diminished by a rising liberal and democratic middle class that has emerged as a result of the expansion of educational opportunity and corresponding affluence, after independence, and by flight and exile after 1986.
Comments
Thanks for your very factual, passionate and elaborate treatise of this article.
Many people have not specifically treated this subject to the extent that you have done here. You have given more insight to very important issues which can help explain in part why many Acholi attempts to move forward positively have been thwarted.
There have been many reasons for the above. First, lack of basic information to use as a springboard to understand keys issues of concern. Second, lack of truthful determination to move ahead, despite setbacks, etc.
Thanks once more, and keep it up.
Nicholas O. P'Okech.