The Way Forward in Northern Uganda lies in a just peace
The way forward in northern Uganda lies with justice being seen to be done in the efforts for a just peace. Therefore, the way forward out of the impasse lies not in a regional military solution, foolishly supported by the UN forces in Congo, but unequivocal support of the ICC indictment of the LRA leaders; the rejection and renunciation of Mato Oput-the Acholi tradition justice mechanism-and the Special unit of the Ugandan High court as complementary and alternative justice mechanisms to the ICC; and the creation of an international Special Tribunal for northern Uganda at the Hague, to investigate and try all cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the period of the conflict before the ICC came into force (1986-2002). The special tribunal and the earlier ICC indictments of the LRA, would then run successevely. Time is of the essence.
There is already something in the air about a possible regional coalition of the willing, to smoke out the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)from wherever they are. The Ugandan press has reported a meeting among military chiefs of Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudanese and UN peacekeeping forces in the Congo. They have resolved to share intelligence and resources, and marshall it to once and for all, deal the LRA and Joseph Kony, a fatal and final blow.
If there were still sceptics, who are unsure whether Juba is comotose or dead, this could not be any clearer signal that, the Juba stage of the long and checkered northern Uganda peace process, needs an undertaker. But who is going to be the brave, clinical mortician who is going to clean up the blood and gore and putrid gashing wounds to make the corpse sterile enough for relatives, friends and sympathetic onlookers to approach and pay their last respects? Possibly none, for the immediate future.
It cannot be Acholi political and civil society leaders. They are in denial, afraid to admit that Juba is dead and it has to be buried. To admit Juba is dead, is to bring in the inquest, and none of them wants that, for were one instituted sooner rather than later, they would haver to face the revelation that, one did not need to support Kony, in order to sabotage or spoil the Juba process. You could be one of its ardent advocates, but if you confine yourself to a narrow perception of the problems, your solutions will also be narrow, and you are bound to make tactical and strategic mistakes. There is no doubt that tactical and strategic mistakes were made by Acholi proponents of the Juba peace process.
First, at times, there was no telling, whether they were and are part of the LRA delegation and aspirations, or not. Cases in point: at the initial stages of the deliberations at Juba, elected leaders-including the leader of the opposition-and civil society leaders vehemently objected to the LRA negotiators talking about northern Uganda and eastern Uganda issues of marginalisation and other war economy related matters. They pointed out that the LRA did not speak for them. This was fair enough, though. However, it was surprising that the same coalition of leaders, did not press strongly for the peace conference and the parties not to include agenda on post-conflict resettlement and reconstruction, because this should be an agenda item to be taken up at a post-Juba phase of a broad and overarching discussions between the government and the greater northern Uganda or Acholi, how the region could be re-absorbed into mainstream life, politics and culture of the Ugandan nationhood.
Second, both the civic and elected leaders were too coy and opportunistic. While they could rightly say that the LRA did not speak for them, they also should have rightly said that most if not all of the other political, social and economic issues the LRA raised in connection with the root causes of the conflict, the historical grievances that existed before and those that were generated by the conflict were true and legitimate. Because, these grievances are real, and the LRA's notoriety does not diminish them. It should have not been thought that to have shared views with the LRA amounted to being an LRA. It was such shallow thinking that led to some of the positions that these issues, including ideas of a federal Ugandan state, giving autonomies to the region, were derided by Acholi civil society and elected leaders-again including the leader of the opposition-that such notions were not the original issues the LRA were fighting for!
Granted, but as part of envisioning the future, could this provide better prospects for stability, peace and better forms and safeguards for people's rights, security and wellbeing, regardless of the fact it originated from the notorious LRA?
Third, these were mistakes that were made, and they were made because these leaders accepted to be forced to think within a box that compartmentalised each and every issue of the conflict and of national importance. Whether it was Acholi local leaders or elected members of parliament, and even those in opposition, including the eminent leader of the opposition, they looked at and they spoke of the LRA insurgency in complete isolation from its broader national context of an autocratic, military dictatorship in Uganda, and the lack of democratic and fundamental freedoms and rights of individuals and groups. In essence, the LRA, as much as the Ugandan state, was responsible in their own shared and different ways, for the debacles of nortehrn Uganda. And any search for a lasting peace with justice, needed to have taken that into consideration and an impartial mechanism put in place to ensure that justice is done.
Unfortunately, we have leaders of political parties and Acholi leaders who for the benefits of their political parties and those who pay the pipers, sometimes speak with candour about the Ugandan military dictatorship in the same tones and on the same themes that the LRA delegates raised in Juba but were shouted down. But how can these problems of lack of democracy, the respect for fundamental rights and freedom, and the tribalism in the distribution of national resources and opportunities and the marginalisation of northern and eastern Uganda be real and legitimate when UPC, FDC or DP raises it, but becomes ethereal in the context of Juba and when the LRA raised it? The enigma of that question is the reason why, neither the Acholi civil society leaders nor the Acholi elected national and local leaders, will not admit Juba is dead and they ought to assume the roles of morticians and bury the corpse, we mourn and raise new hopes elsewhere.
The way forward from a necessary, immediate requiem for Juba, therefore, lies along these paths.
1. First, Acholi leaders must admit that Juba is dead and something new needs to be put in its place. And to recognise that the ICC partiality in indicting the LRA alone, and its seeming injustice, is partly to blame for the death of Juba. But before anything new can be contemplated, Acholi needs to claim some bequeaths from Juba:
a. To do everything in their power, to ensure that there is no return to war, despite the drumbeats. And should they be ignored on this, Acholi must be ready to throw all caution to the wind, and begin to reflect on how it will take its own destiny into its own hands;
b. To do everything in their power, to rampt up disbandment of the camps and resettling people back home. The critical element here is to reassure the population that, they should be calm and continue with preparations for returning to their ancestral homesteads. This will involve campaigns and advocacy in collaboration with progressive NGOS to ensure that resettlement and reconstruction is directly funded and not merely undertaken as a governmental, normal, budgetary planning and squeezed among anonymous recurrent expenditures, rather than a massive response to a chronic emergency and transition to resettlement and reconstruction.
While this is on-going with a dedicated, multidisciplinary team of Acholi technocrats and experts-drawn from inside and outside Uganda-, another team and similarly constituted, must work on the way forward. And their task will entail the following:
1. Accept the ICC indictments in principle and spirit, and undertake to work with the ICC and investigators, to uncover evidence and provide testimony;
2. De-register or delete, or renounce and reject Mato Oput and the special division of the Uganda high court, as alternative justice mechanisms to the ICC and means to a just and sustainable peace in northern Uganda;
3. Instead of Mato Oput and a special division of the Uganda high court, propose and work hard on the creation of an International Speical Tribunal for Northern Uganda, to undertake investigations and bring to justice, all the parties to the conflict, who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, between 1986 -2002, the period ommitted by the ICC Rome Statute. To continue with the status quo, is a moral outrage.
For fairness, this tribunal should also be based in the Hague and the same judges of the ICC who would try the LRA for the ICC indictments, should try those implicated and indicted by the special tribunal. Peace and justice are not mutually exclusive. A national Truth and Reconciliation Commission can then take care of other minor crimes and the need to reconcile the fragmented nation.
Failure to tread this path, will hand the opportunity to those who are beating war drums and care jack, about Acholi suffering and future. The time has come for those who care about Acholi and its future, to put their feet on the ground and say enough is enogh; we shall not be pushed any further against the wall.
There is already something in the air about a possible regional coalition of the willing, to smoke out the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)from wherever they are. The Ugandan press has reported a meeting among military chiefs of Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudanese and UN peacekeeping forces in the Congo. They have resolved to share intelligence and resources, and marshall it to once and for all, deal the LRA and Joseph Kony, a fatal and final blow.
If there were still sceptics, who are unsure whether Juba is comotose or dead, this could not be any clearer signal that, the Juba stage of the long and checkered northern Uganda peace process, needs an undertaker. But who is going to be the brave, clinical mortician who is going to clean up the blood and gore and putrid gashing wounds to make the corpse sterile enough for relatives, friends and sympathetic onlookers to approach and pay their last respects? Possibly none, for the immediate future.
It cannot be Acholi political and civil society leaders. They are in denial, afraid to admit that Juba is dead and it has to be buried. To admit Juba is dead, is to bring in the inquest, and none of them wants that, for were one instituted sooner rather than later, they would haver to face the revelation that, one did not need to support Kony, in order to sabotage or spoil the Juba process. You could be one of its ardent advocates, but if you confine yourself to a narrow perception of the problems, your solutions will also be narrow, and you are bound to make tactical and strategic mistakes. There is no doubt that tactical and strategic mistakes were made by Acholi proponents of the Juba peace process.
First, at times, there was no telling, whether they were and are part of the LRA delegation and aspirations, or not. Cases in point: at the initial stages of the deliberations at Juba, elected leaders-including the leader of the opposition-and civil society leaders vehemently objected to the LRA negotiators talking about northern Uganda and eastern Uganda issues of marginalisation and other war economy related matters. They pointed out that the LRA did not speak for them. This was fair enough, though. However, it was surprising that the same coalition of leaders, did not press strongly for the peace conference and the parties not to include agenda on post-conflict resettlement and reconstruction, because this should be an agenda item to be taken up at a post-Juba phase of a broad and overarching discussions between the government and the greater northern Uganda or Acholi, how the region could be re-absorbed into mainstream life, politics and culture of the Ugandan nationhood.
Second, both the civic and elected leaders were too coy and opportunistic. While they could rightly say that the LRA did not speak for them, they also should have rightly said that most if not all of the other political, social and economic issues the LRA raised in connection with the root causes of the conflict, the historical grievances that existed before and those that were generated by the conflict were true and legitimate. Because, these grievances are real, and the LRA's notoriety does not diminish them. It should have not been thought that to have shared views with the LRA amounted to being an LRA. It was such shallow thinking that led to some of the positions that these issues, including ideas of a federal Ugandan state, giving autonomies to the region, were derided by Acholi civil society and elected leaders-again including the leader of the opposition-that such notions were not the original issues the LRA were fighting for!
Granted, but as part of envisioning the future, could this provide better prospects for stability, peace and better forms and safeguards for people's rights, security and wellbeing, regardless of the fact it originated from the notorious LRA?
Third, these were mistakes that were made, and they were made because these leaders accepted to be forced to think within a box that compartmentalised each and every issue of the conflict and of national importance. Whether it was Acholi local leaders or elected members of parliament, and even those in opposition, including the eminent leader of the opposition, they looked at and they spoke of the LRA insurgency in complete isolation from its broader national context of an autocratic, military dictatorship in Uganda, and the lack of democratic and fundamental freedoms and rights of individuals and groups. In essence, the LRA, as much as the Ugandan state, was responsible in their own shared and different ways, for the debacles of nortehrn Uganda. And any search for a lasting peace with justice, needed to have taken that into consideration and an impartial mechanism put in place to ensure that justice is done.
Unfortunately, we have leaders of political parties and Acholi leaders who for the benefits of their political parties and those who pay the pipers, sometimes speak with candour about the Ugandan military dictatorship in the same tones and on the same themes that the LRA delegates raised in Juba but were shouted down. But how can these problems of lack of democracy, the respect for fundamental rights and freedom, and the tribalism in the distribution of national resources and opportunities and the marginalisation of northern and eastern Uganda be real and legitimate when UPC, FDC or DP raises it, but becomes ethereal in the context of Juba and when the LRA raised it? The enigma of that question is the reason why, neither the Acholi civil society leaders nor the Acholi elected national and local leaders, will not admit Juba is dead and they ought to assume the roles of morticians and bury the corpse, we mourn and raise new hopes elsewhere.
The way forward from a necessary, immediate requiem for Juba, therefore, lies along these paths.
1. First, Acholi leaders must admit that Juba is dead and something new needs to be put in its place. And to recognise that the ICC partiality in indicting the LRA alone, and its seeming injustice, is partly to blame for the death of Juba. But before anything new can be contemplated, Acholi needs to claim some bequeaths from Juba:
a. To do everything in their power, to ensure that there is no return to war, despite the drumbeats. And should they be ignored on this, Acholi must be ready to throw all caution to the wind, and begin to reflect on how it will take its own destiny into its own hands;
b. To do everything in their power, to rampt up disbandment of the camps and resettling people back home. The critical element here is to reassure the population that, they should be calm and continue with preparations for returning to their ancestral homesteads. This will involve campaigns and advocacy in collaboration with progressive NGOS to ensure that resettlement and reconstruction is directly funded and not merely undertaken as a governmental, normal, budgetary planning and squeezed among anonymous recurrent expenditures, rather than a massive response to a chronic emergency and transition to resettlement and reconstruction.
While this is on-going with a dedicated, multidisciplinary team of Acholi technocrats and experts-drawn from inside and outside Uganda-, another team and similarly constituted, must work on the way forward. And their task will entail the following:
1. Accept the ICC indictments in principle and spirit, and undertake to work with the ICC and investigators, to uncover evidence and provide testimony;
2. De-register or delete, or renounce and reject Mato Oput and the special division of the Uganda high court, as alternative justice mechanisms to the ICC and means to a just and sustainable peace in northern Uganda;
3. Instead of Mato Oput and a special division of the Uganda high court, propose and work hard on the creation of an International Speical Tribunal for Northern Uganda, to undertake investigations and bring to justice, all the parties to the conflict, who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, between 1986 -2002, the period ommitted by the ICC Rome Statute. To continue with the status quo, is a moral outrage.
For fairness, this tribunal should also be based in the Hague and the same judges of the ICC who would try the LRA for the ICC indictments, should try those implicated and indicted by the special tribunal. Peace and justice are not mutually exclusive. A national Truth and Reconciliation Commission can then take care of other minor crimes and the need to reconcile the fragmented nation.
Failure to tread this path, will hand the opportunity to those who are beating war drums and care jack, about Acholi suffering and future. The time has come for those who care about Acholi and its future, to put their feet on the ground and say enough is enogh; we shall not be pushed any further against the wall.
Comments
Your analysis is sport on, but we need a leader to champion that. Such special UN tribunal could also look at the justification of the Luwero war which ushered in the NRA/M administration.
Remember they have so far refused to be subjected to any investigation whether as a rebel force or when already in government.
Lastly, why are leaders like Olara Otunu and Akena p'Ojok silent?
Muto