Why Museveni is Undermining a Negotiated Peace Settlement
Why Museveni is undermining a negotiated settlement
Garamba Sideshow: Divide and Conquer
Dead or alive, the fate of Vincent Otti, if Joseph Kony is to be believed, may well have been foreshadowed a year ago (LRA leader speaks out on deputy Otti, Monitor 8 Nov. 2007). It was reported then that the Ugandan government had focused its efforts at a parallel contact with the LRA fighters, rather than the official Juba Talks, as a preferred means to ending the conflict (Kony wants to talk to Museveni, Monitor, 23-29 July 2006). Such a strategy aimed to achieve one or more of the following objectives: to avoid addressing the root causes of the conflict; to isolate the LRA military leaders and fighters from its political leadership; and also to pre-empt the risk of issues raised at the Juba talks cohering with grievances and concerns over abuses in northern Uganda, which had sporadically been raised by civil society, political leaders, opposition parties, the media and rights groups.
The sideshow in Garamba, led by Walter Ochora, Gulu RDC, also aimed to sow discord, mistrust and suspicions among LRA military leaders. These were to be achieved by all means of enticements including money, promises of presidential amnesty to induce high level and mass defections. Achieving one or a combination of these possible objectives was hoped to effectively pre-empt and scuttle a possible comprehensive settlement at the negotiating table. Coming as it did, the rumours of Vincent Otti’s death, or a possible fall-out between him and Joseph Kony, therefore, would have unfolded along a script authored by the UPDF High Command, and stage-managed by Walter Ochora and the 4th division hierarchy in northern Uganda. Accordingly, Lt. Chris Magezi’s denial to the BBC, of a possible UPDF plot to foment unrest within or portray the LRA as defeated and disintegrated force without organisation and unified command with whom negotiations was no longer necessary, is at best disingenuous, and crocodile tears at worst (Uganda rebel deputy feared dead, BBC online, Wed. 7 Nov. 2007).
Undoubtedly, it is in the express interest of Yoweri Museveni for the LRA to surrender (Talks resume tomorrow, Monitor, 6 August 2006). At the beginning of the talks-any change to the contrary is doubtful-defence minister Chrispus Kiyonga insisted that despite the talks in Juba, the UPDF would still attack the LRA. And indeed they did attack, resulting in the killing of Raska Lukwiya, one of the indicted LRA commanders. It is no secret that, for Museveni and the government, the preferred means to force LRA capitulation is first through military pursuit, psychological warfare and subversive counter-intelligence (ICC wants rebel’s corpse, Monitor, 13 Aug. 2006). Part of the determination to achieve military victory, is not simply to end the insurgency, but what Onyango Obbo’s inside sources revealed as Museveni’s unyielding mission to defeat and explode the myth of northern tribal martial invincibility (Who wins if peace comes-Museveni or Kony? Monitor 31 Aug. 20-06). This view is supported by Olara Otunnu, who shows that the war has provided a perfect cover for Museveni to pursue inexplicable agendas other than defend the human rights of the citizens of northern and eastern Uganda (A Nation in Crisis, allAfrica.com, 19 Sept. 2006).
The second tier of preferences is threats with the sticks of ICC arrests weighed on the opposite end by carrots of presidential pardon. As far as Museveni and the government are concerned, it would be best if the LRA were decisively defeated or if the ICC warrant and military pressure could force a surrender or popular disaffection, mass defection and collapse of the LRA as an insurgent force in order to avoid the difficult and unpredictable prospects of a trial by the ICC or a special court in Uganda. This, for Museveni, would also mark his crowning as the indomitable southern military leader who brought the so-called insuperable martial tribes of the upper Nile to their knees. This sham goal matters to Museveni more than anything else he has ever accomplished in his career. Defeating and punishing northerners, for obscure reasons best known to Museveni, was the obsession that took him to Luwero in 1981. It will do anything to achieve something of a military victory. Therefore, suspicions that the UPDF has been investing heavily in convert activities to undermine LRA leadership and command, or cause rifts among senior LRA commanders for the insurgent organisation to implode, are not without merits (LRA leader speaks on deputy Otti, New Vision, 8 Nov. 2007).
History punishes those who do not learn its lessons
We will recall that, at the beginning of the Juba talks in 2006, Uganda tried and failed to alienate the LRA military leaders from their civilian delegation to the talks. A strategy of dividing and isolating insurgent fighters from their political leadership is not new. In 1988, the Museveni government did just that, in its negotiations with the UPDM/A (Reaching the 1988 Pece Agreement, Accord, No.11, 2002). Then UPDA insurgent forces were predominantly semi-literate and politically and socially unconscious, and without significant capacity to raise fundamental issues greater than their self-interests:limited concerns for their welfare and privileges. To such men, Museveni could posture with false empathy that the UPDM political leadership in exile was a breed of discredited politicians who messed up the country and were ensconced in foreign capitals sipping whiskey, while the fighters were suffering in the bushes. Essentially, the argument sought to exploit a supposed brotherhood between the NRA and UPDA fighters as soldiers first and foremost, and therefore, comrades- in -arms. The attractive yet deceptive logic it appealed to was that, as comrades, the NRA had no fundamental problems with the UPDA fighters, but the politicians who misled them; first to war in Luwero, and later hoodwinked them into rebellion after Museveni defeated them and seized power.
Museveni feared to negotiate with the UPDM/A as a unified military and political organisation in 1988 for two principle reasons. First, he did not want to address the root causes of the rebellion and it was best if he avoided equally seasoned UPDM/A political leadership. Second, he did not know how to deal with the questions of trust and credibility arising from his unilateral abrogation of the 1985 Nairobi peace agreement and framework for national reconciliation and unity that had offered Uganda the best hope for peace and stability. After cheaply disposing of the fighters, it was no surprise that two years later in 1990, Museveni sought and concluded the Addis Ababa agreement with the political wing of the UPDM/A. At this time, the fighters were already demobilised. Some of its more politically conscious leaders, including but not limited to Kilama, Obote, and Ochero, were executed, imprisoned or forced to flee. In the end, UPDM/A political leadership had no strength to put up demands it could not back up with a fighting force strong enough to impose its will or engage in a contest of wills in case of NRM/A intransigence. As a result, UPDM leadership in exile had no choice but to capitulate and accept offers of personal gratification and privileges on Museni’s terms.
In retrospect, it should be clear to those who should have learned from the histories of peace processes with Museveni that it is not for nothing that he would rather talk to the functionally illiterate former abducted children in Garamba. In addition, his initial criticisms and casting of the LRA delegation in Juba as non-authentic, aimed to remove a more enlightened group of players from the scene. This would have left him with people he could easily manipulate and dispose of without conceding anything he did not want to give. It did not matter to him that the team in Juba were appointed by Kony and mandated to speak for the LRM/A. However, our curiosity should be aroused at the new LRA Juba delegation that were disparaged by the Uganda government a year ago, but as late as this week, being embraced in Kampala, to do business with Museveni. This begs the question: Do they still represent the LRA and Kony? Sensing the need to answer that question, the permanent secretary, ministry of internal affairs, Dr. Stephen Kagoda, had to assuage the nation that the delegation was legit, to allay public scepticisms about plenipotentiary standing of the LRA delegation in representing Kony or the LRM/A (Kony backed Ojul, New Vision, 12 Nov. 2007).
Public worries had been aroused by the rumours of Vincent Otti’s death. And we should all be worried over these inexplicable rumours and unexpected camaraderie that include bear hug embraces; when barely over a year ago, handshakes were taboo.
Every Man has his price
We should wonder what the nature of the business is that should have belatedly endeared the much maligned Juba delegation of the LRA to the Kampala regime. In our considered view, intrigue cannot be too far down the list. Intrigues and divide and rule tactics have worked well for Museveni over the years. It is possible that, after failing to create a rift between LRA military leaders and the peace delegation in Juba, in order to create opportunity of talking to semi-literate men as they did in 1988, the government set about to maximise potential for covert activities to set the LRA military hierarchy against each other. This strategy must have become a priority after the Juba talks took on a life of its own, and acquired a higher profile with the appointment of Joachim Chissano as UN Secretary General’s Envoy to the region and the talks. Coupled with the unexpected plenipotentiary suave and political astuteness of the LRA delegation, the government of Uganda lost control of the Juba talks agenda and process and needed to scramble a strategy and agenda it could control that could still undermine a possible comprehensive settlement reached by negotiations and a peace treaty in Juba. The motivation for this is that any settlement that leaves room for a trial of any kind, other than mato oput or Acholi traditional justice system, risks opening cans of worms that the Uganda government would rather avoid, if it could.
It is therefore reasonable to ask: Have the people who are supposed to read the fine prints for the LRA military leadership and cut a good deal for Kony & Co., not been compromised to shove just anything under his nose for trinkets? Given the circumstances, such a question is not idle. Two critical events raised the stakes and forced active pursuit of option B. First, the Uganda government was taken off-guard by the LRA Juba delegation; virtually upstaged at the opening session of the talks. The LRA/M Juba delegation exploded on the scene as more sophisticated; politically conscious; articulate; world -wise; underestimated and capable of raising credible issues of the causes of the war and its impact on Acholi and other northern and eastern Ugandan communities (LRA opening address at the Juba Talks, 15 July 2006; LRA position papers on Accountability and Reconciliation, 20 June 2007; Peace talks need focus, New Vision, 26 June 2007; Will geographical north rally around political LRA? Monitor, 31 Aug 2006). In addition, goings-on in Juba had revealed that among the delegation, there were young and old alike; men and women who were ambitious and whose lifestyles and personal needs fortified the axiom that every man has his price.
Second, the Ugandan delegation and government could not countermand the plausibility of the LRM/A delegation position, and chose the only defence that had often worked for them-to character assassinate and discredit its critics. For instance, in a lengthy guest column on allAfrica.com, Museveni attacked Olara Otunu as a supporter of former murderous regimes (Our People Embrace Peace, allAfrica.com, 19 Sept. 2006). This was in response to Otunnu's insistent campaign to draw national and international attention to the northern Uganda genocide, co-authored by Yoweri Museveni and Joseph Kony. Similarly, the LRA delegates in Juba mounted a strong contest to Uganda governmnet view that the LRA was the sole perpetrator of atrocities in northern Uganda. In response, the Uganda delegation and Museveni sought to question their credibility, authenticity and authority of non-combatant diaspora-based LRA spokespersons to speaking on behalf of the fighters in Garamba. LRA.
Revealingly, the problem of the Uganda government did not seem limited to who was raising theses issues or that they were being raised at all. The regime was worried that it should be raised in a manner that echoes and integrates the concerns of the civil population in eastern and northern Uganda, the opposition parties, and rights groups with that of the rebel fighters. But the government opposition to and strategy to discredit the LRA delegates collapsed in the face of strong Kony and Otti backing of their team in Juba, even allowing them to shuttle between Garamba and Juba for consultations. It seemed that things were not going Museveni's way, even after he flew with a full military squadron to Juba to intimidate the delegates. The Uganda government was therefore scared and desperate to re-assert itself. Museveni was determined to undermine the talks and achieve LRA surrender under UPDF peace terms. And it was obvious that divide and conquer tactics would be used, among other things.
Isolating one group from or setting one against the other has always been Museveni's grand political strategy, particularly in northern Uganda. For instance, Uganda is nominally operating under a parliamentary dispensation. One would think that parliament, incorporating government and opposition parties would be involved in a high national profile issue like peace talks to end insurgency that has devastated more than 27% of the country. That the opposition is not represented in Juba is no accident. The opposition has been raising the same issues of governance and human rights that the LRA delegation raised in Juba. Furthermore, the community and political leaders from eastern and northern Uganda have not been given a place at the Juba Talks as legitimate stakeholders and primary parties to the process and terms of agreements that arise from it. Instead, they are relegated to the sidelines as mere observers, not expected to present any grievances, articulate the urgent need for a just peace, or influence the outcome to include mechanisms that would ensure the kind of peace they want.
In the NRM’s grand scheme of things, religious leaders, traditional leaders, district council political leaders and representatives of parliamentary groups from eastern and northern Uganda, must be kept at bay. It is necessary that they are not substantively involved, lest their respective knowledge and memory of the war, its causes, as well as their demands for its end, correspond with and reinforce some of the issues the LRA raised. It is feared that a possible confluence of demands, and a meeting of minds and hearts between opposition politicians and insurgents, would constitute an unacceptable and unsettling unity of northern and north-eastern grand political spectre and possibilities (Will geographical north rally around political LRA? Monitor 31 Aug. 2006). No one, including the government, has any illusion about the truth behind most, if not all of the issues the LRA raised at the Juba Talks regarding the history of the war and its origins; the brutal methods of counterinsurgency; forced movement of people into camps; shared culpability for abuses and atrocities committed; and the need for reparation and reconstruction of the region.
As far as Museveni is concerned, a peace talk on the Juba framework is unacceptable, because its agenda must necessarily address the root causes of the conflict, which inevitably must highlight abuses and atrocities on both sides. But talking with the LRA directly, and without a mediator, would cut out pertinent accountability for war crimes and rights abuses as well as political and governance reforms questions. Consequently, this would then give Museveni and the LRA the opportunity to address only the basic needs and personal privileges and gratifications of the rank and file of the fighters with incentive for money, houses, ranks in the UPDF and amnesty from criminal prosecutions. Under such disguised surrender terms, Museveni and the UPDF are shielded from exposure and accounting for their own counter-insurgency strategies that harmed more than vindicated human rights of non-combatants in eastern and northern Uganda. This is precisely why mato oput or traditional justice is more acceptable to Museveni, not because he has recently had a revelation of and conversion to a newer and conciliatory self; but rather, he dreads the double-edged sword of the ICC that could cut both ways in an adversarial trial, testimony and cross examination of evidence and witnesses.
Juba remains the best hope for a semblance of a just peace
On balance, the prospect of a Museveni-Kony deal outside of the Juba Talks does not bode well for long term peace and stability for Uganda and particularly the eastern and northern communities. First, the need for peace, the conditions and mechanisms necessary for a comprehensive settlement and durable peace will have not been addressed at all. In other words, the plight and needs of the people in concentration camps at the centre of the Juba Talks will have been displaced by the needs of the LRA fighters and Museveni’s self-interested calculations as the impetus for ending the conflict. Second, the LRA fighters would be reintegrated into these societies and many others absorbed into the UPDF and deployed in eastern and northern Uganda.
Such a course would forever make demobilised LRA combatants grateful and beholden to Museveni personally, and only too eager and willing to do his biddings. Fears for such prospects are not borne out of unfounded cynicisms but concrete experiences. Witness the pro-Museveni overzealousness of former UPDM/A commanders such as Col. Walter Ochora and Col. Otema Awany; the exploits of Maj. Okot Wiilit and Maj. Fearless Obwoya; and the activities of former LRA honchos Brig. Kenneth Banaya, Brig. Sam Kolo, Maj. Ray Apire, and Col. Onen Kamdulu, to mention but a few. It did not bother anyone in Uganda, and internationally, that this latter group returned from the bushes and kept as wives, girls they abducted, raped and used as sex slaves.
Furthermore, a person like Brig. Banya, Brig. Kolo, and Maj. Apire are the original LRA. As officers and commanders, they should be more responsible for alleged abduction, extrajudicial execution and destruction in northern Uganda. But since their return and willingness to serve Museveni's whims, they are shielded and the ICC not bothered about them. This is despite the fact that while these three were not abducted but are former soldiers and adults who joined the LRA willingly, the other commanders such as Raska Lukwiya and Dominic Ongwen, who have been indicted by the ICC, were abducted as children and trained by the Banyas and Kolos in the trade they now stand accused of.
For those interested in a negotiated settlement and a just peace through the success of the Juba Talks, there is need to understand the objective history of the war (Accord, No. 11, 2002) and not let the methods of the LRM/A insurgency and its alleged brutalities dim our own memory of the war or cloud our judgements on how best durable peace can be achieved. No doubt, there are enough evidence of atrocities on both sides to warrant summary, public executions of the highest ranking leaders and their generals on both sides. But what is needed now is a mechanism to bring the war and the suffering of the eastern and northern population to an end. This implies that, the Juba Talks, rather than some sideshow in Garamba, is the best framework and prospects for comprehensive ceasefire and the road to peace. Culpability for atrocities should be left to the next stage of the process, which must necessarily envisage addressing the inadequacy of the ICC indictments, and the preference for a UN Special Tribunal for Northern Uganda, to investigate and try all perpetrators guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity over the entire history of the war from 1986.
As a meaningful way forward, and for a sustainable peace afterwards, the Juba Talks must also suppose the setting up of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Anything short of an honest, just and equitable peace and settlement, will only act as a temporary band aid measure that is bound to rapture with irreparable consequences. There should be no shortcuts. And in keeping with our moral quest for a just and equitable peace, we must avoid falling prey to making a moral distinction between atrocities committed by non-state parties and that perpetrated by the state. Neither public tears of remorse nor wrapping oneself in the national flag should obstruct our perception and even-handed judgment of criminal acts and responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in northern Uganda.
Garamba Sideshow: Divide and Conquer
Dead or alive, the fate of Vincent Otti, if Joseph Kony is to be believed, may well have been foreshadowed a year ago (LRA leader speaks out on deputy Otti, Monitor 8 Nov. 2007). It was reported then that the Ugandan government had focused its efforts at a parallel contact with the LRA fighters, rather than the official Juba Talks, as a preferred means to ending the conflict (Kony wants to talk to Museveni, Monitor, 23-29 July 2006). Such a strategy aimed to achieve one or more of the following objectives: to avoid addressing the root causes of the conflict; to isolate the LRA military leaders and fighters from its political leadership; and also to pre-empt the risk of issues raised at the Juba talks cohering with grievances and concerns over abuses in northern Uganda, which had sporadically been raised by civil society, political leaders, opposition parties, the media and rights groups.
The sideshow in Garamba, led by Walter Ochora, Gulu RDC, also aimed to sow discord, mistrust and suspicions among LRA military leaders. These were to be achieved by all means of enticements including money, promises of presidential amnesty to induce high level and mass defections. Achieving one or a combination of these possible objectives was hoped to effectively pre-empt and scuttle a possible comprehensive settlement at the negotiating table. Coming as it did, the rumours of Vincent Otti’s death, or a possible fall-out between him and Joseph Kony, therefore, would have unfolded along a script authored by the UPDF High Command, and stage-managed by Walter Ochora and the 4th division hierarchy in northern Uganda. Accordingly, Lt. Chris Magezi’s denial to the BBC, of a possible UPDF plot to foment unrest within or portray the LRA as defeated and disintegrated force without organisation and unified command with whom negotiations was no longer necessary, is at best disingenuous, and crocodile tears at worst (Uganda rebel deputy feared dead, BBC online, Wed. 7 Nov. 2007).
Undoubtedly, it is in the express interest of Yoweri Museveni for the LRA to surrender (Talks resume tomorrow, Monitor, 6 August 2006). At the beginning of the talks-any change to the contrary is doubtful-defence minister Chrispus Kiyonga insisted that despite the talks in Juba, the UPDF would still attack the LRA. And indeed they did attack, resulting in the killing of Raska Lukwiya, one of the indicted LRA commanders. It is no secret that, for Museveni and the government, the preferred means to force LRA capitulation is first through military pursuit, psychological warfare and subversive counter-intelligence (ICC wants rebel’s corpse, Monitor, 13 Aug. 2006). Part of the determination to achieve military victory, is not simply to end the insurgency, but what Onyango Obbo’s inside sources revealed as Museveni’s unyielding mission to defeat and explode the myth of northern tribal martial invincibility (Who wins if peace comes-Museveni or Kony? Monitor 31 Aug. 20-06). This view is supported by Olara Otunnu, who shows that the war has provided a perfect cover for Museveni to pursue inexplicable agendas other than defend the human rights of the citizens of northern and eastern Uganda (A Nation in Crisis, allAfrica.com, 19 Sept. 2006).
The second tier of preferences is threats with the sticks of ICC arrests weighed on the opposite end by carrots of presidential pardon. As far as Museveni and the government are concerned, it would be best if the LRA were decisively defeated or if the ICC warrant and military pressure could force a surrender or popular disaffection, mass defection and collapse of the LRA as an insurgent force in order to avoid the difficult and unpredictable prospects of a trial by the ICC or a special court in Uganda. This, for Museveni, would also mark his crowning as the indomitable southern military leader who brought the so-called insuperable martial tribes of the upper Nile to their knees. This sham goal matters to Museveni more than anything else he has ever accomplished in his career. Defeating and punishing northerners, for obscure reasons best known to Museveni, was the obsession that took him to Luwero in 1981. It will do anything to achieve something of a military victory. Therefore, suspicions that the UPDF has been investing heavily in convert activities to undermine LRA leadership and command, or cause rifts among senior LRA commanders for the insurgent organisation to implode, are not without merits (LRA leader speaks on deputy Otti, New Vision, 8 Nov. 2007).
History punishes those who do not learn its lessons
We will recall that, at the beginning of the Juba talks in 2006, Uganda tried and failed to alienate the LRA military leaders from their civilian delegation to the talks. A strategy of dividing and isolating insurgent fighters from their political leadership is not new. In 1988, the Museveni government did just that, in its negotiations with the UPDM/A (Reaching the 1988 Pece Agreement, Accord, No.11, 2002). Then UPDA insurgent forces were predominantly semi-literate and politically and socially unconscious, and without significant capacity to raise fundamental issues greater than their self-interests:limited concerns for their welfare and privileges. To such men, Museveni could posture with false empathy that the UPDM political leadership in exile was a breed of discredited politicians who messed up the country and were ensconced in foreign capitals sipping whiskey, while the fighters were suffering in the bushes. Essentially, the argument sought to exploit a supposed brotherhood between the NRA and UPDA fighters as soldiers first and foremost, and therefore, comrades- in -arms. The attractive yet deceptive logic it appealed to was that, as comrades, the NRA had no fundamental problems with the UPDA fighters, but the politicians who misled them; first to war in Luwero, and later hoodwinked them into rebellion after Museveni defeated them and seized power.
Museveni feared to negotiate with the UPDM/A as a unified military and political organisation in 1988 for two principle reasons. First, he did not want to address the root causes of the rebellion and it was best if he avoided equally seasoned UPDM/A political leadership. Second, he did not know how to deal with the questions of trust and credibility arising from his unilateral abrogation of the 1985 Nairobi peace agreement and framework for national reconciliation and unity that had offered Uganda the best hope for peace and stability. After cheaply disposing of the fighters, it was no surprise that two years later in 1990, Museveni sought and concluded the Addis Ababa agreement with the political wing of the UPDM/A. At this time, the fighters were already demobilised. Some of its more politically conscious leaders, including but not limited to Kilama, Obote, and Ochero, were executed, imprisoned or forced to flee. In the end, UPDM/A political leadership had no strength to put up demands it could not back up with a fighting force strong enough to impose its will or engage in a contest of wills in case of NRM/A intransigence. As a result, UPDM leadership in exile had no choice but to capitulate and accept offers of personal gratification and privileges on Museni’s terms.
In retrospect, it should be clear to those who should have learned from the histories of peace processes with Museveni that it is not for nothing that he would rather talk to the functionally illiterate former abducted children in Garamba. In addition, his initial criticisms and casting of the LRA delegation in Juba as non-authentic, aimed to remove a more enlightened group of players from the scene. This would have left him with people he could easily manipulate and dispose of without conceding anything he did not want to give. It did not matter to him that the team in Juba were appointed by Kony and mandated to speak for the LRM/A. However, our curiosity should be aroused at the new LRA Juba delegation that were disparaged by the Uganda government a year ago, but as late as this week, being embraced in Kampala, to do business with Museveni. This begs the question: Do they still represent the LRA and Kony? Sensing the need to answer that question, the permanent secretary, ministry of internal affairs, Dr. Stephen Kagoda, had to assuage the nation that the delegation was legit, to allay public scepticisms about plenipotentiary standing of the LRA delegation in representing Kony or the LRM/A (Kony backed Ojul, New Vision, 12 Nov. 2007).
Public worries had been aroused by the rumours of Vincent Otti’s death. And we should all be worried over these inexplicable rumours and unexpected camaraderie that include bear hug embraces; when barely over a year ago, handshakes were taboo.
Every Man has his price
We should wonder what the nature of the business is that should have belatedly endeared the much maligned Juba delegation of the LRA to the Kampala regime. In our considered view, intrigue cannot be too far down the list. Intrigues and divide and rule tactics have worked well for Museveni over the years. It is possible that, after failing to create a rift between LRA military leaders and the peace delegation in Juba, in order to create opportunity of talking to semi-literate men as they did in 1988, the government set about to maximise potential for covert activities to set the LRA military hierarchy against each other. This strategy must have become a priority after the Juba talks took on a life of its own, and acquired a higher profile with the appointment of Joachim Chissano as UN Secretary General’s Envoy to the region and the talks. Coupled with the unexpected plenipotentiary suave and political astuteness of the LRA delegation, the government of Uganda lost control of the Juba talks agenda and process and needed to scramble a strategy and agenda it could control that could still undermine a possible comprehensive settlement reached by negotiations and a peace treaty in Juba. The motivation for this is that any settlement that leaves room for a trial of any kind, other than mato oput or Acholi traditional justice system, risks opening cans of worms that the Uganda government would rather avoid, if it could.
It is therefore reasonable to ask: Have the people who are supposed to read the fine prints for the LRA military leadership and cut a good deal for Kony & Co., not been compromised to shove just anything under his nose for trinkets? Given the circumstances, such a question is not idle. Two critical events raised the stakes and forced active pursuit of option B. First, the Uganda government was taken off-guard by the LRA Juba delegation; virtually upstaged at the opening session of the talks. The LRA/M Juba delegation exploded on the scene as more sophisticated; politically conscious; articulate; world -wise; underestimated and capable of raising credible issues of the causes of the war and its impact on Acholi and other northern and eastern Ugandan communities (LRA opening address at the Juba Talks, 15 July 2006; LRA position papers on Accountability and Reconciliation, 20 June 2007; Peace talks need focus, New Vision, 26 June 2007; Will geographical north rally around political LRA? Monitor, 31 Aug 2006). In addition, goings-on in Juba had revealed that among the delegation, there were young and old alike; men and women who were ambitious and whose lifestyles and personal needs fortified the axiom that every man has his price.
Second, the Ugandan delegation and government could not countermand the plausibility of the LRM/A delegation position, and chose the only defence that had often worked for them-to character assassinate and discredit its critics. For instance, in a lengthy guest column on allAfrica.com, Museveni attacked Olara Otunu as a supporter of former murderous regimes (Our People Embrace Peace, allAfrica.com, 19 Sept. 2006). This was in response to Otunnu's insistent campaign to draw national and international attention to the northern Uganda genocide, co-authored by Yoweri Museveni and Joseph Kony. Similarly, the LRA delegates in Juba mounted a strong contest to Uganda governmnet view that the LRA was the sole perpetrator of atrocities in northern Uganda. In response, the Uganda delegation and Museveni sought to question their credibility, authenticity and authority of non-combatant diaspora-based LRA spokespersons to speaking on behalf of the fighters in Garamba. LRA.
Revealingly, the problem of the Uganda government did not seem limited to who was raising theses issues or that they were being raised at all. The regime was worried that it should be raised in a manner that echoes and integrates the concerns of the civil population in eastern and northern Uganda, the opposition parties, and rights groups with that of the rebel fighters. But the government opposition to and strategy to discredit the LRA delegates collapsed in the face of strong Kony and Otti backing of their team in Juba, even allowing them to shuttle between Garamba and Juba for consultations. It seemed that things were not going Museveni's way, even after he flew with a full military squadron to Juba to intimidate the delegates. The Uganda government was therefore scared and desperate to re-assert itself. Museveni was determined to undermine the talks and achieve LRA surrender under UPDF peace terms. And it was obvious that divide and conquer tactics would be used, among other things.
Isolating one group from or setting one against the other has always been Museveni's grand political strategy, particularly in northern Uganda. For instance, Uganda is nominally operating under a parliamentary dispensation. One would think that parliament, incorporating government and opposition parties would be involved in a high national profile issue like peace talks to end insurgency that has devastated more than 27% of the country. That the opposition is not represented in Juba is no accident. The opposition has been raising the same issues of governance and human rights that the LRA delegation raised in Juba. Furthermore, the community and political leaders from eastern and northern Uganda have not been given a place at the Juba Talks as legitimate stakeholders and primary parties to the process and terms of agreements that arise from it. Instead, they are relegated to the sidelines as mere observers, not expected to present any grievances, articulate the urgent need for a just peace, or influence the outcome to include mechanisms that would ensure the kind of peace they want.
In the NRM’s grand scheme of things, religious leaders, traditional leaders, district council political leaders and representatives of parliamentary groups from eastern and northern Uganda, must be kept at bay. It is necessary that they are not substantively involved, lest their respective knowledge and memory of the war, its causes, as well as their demands for its end, correspond with and reinforce some of the issues the LRA raised. It is feared that a possible confluence of demands, and a meeting of minds and hearts between opposition politicians and insurgents, would constitute an unacceptable and unsettling unity of northern and north-eastern grand political spectre and possibilities (Will geographical north rally around political LRA? Monitor 31 Aug. 2006). No one, including the government, has any illusion about the truth behind most, if not all of the issues the LRA raised at the Juba Talks regarding the history of the war and its origins; the brutal methods of counterinsurgency; forced movement of people into camps; shared culpability for abuses and atrocities committed; and the need for reparation and reconstruction of the region.
As far as Museveni is concerned, a peace talk on the Juba framework is unacceptable, because its agenda must necessarily address the root causes of the conflict, which inevitably must highlight abuses and atrocities on both sides. But talking with the LRA directly, and without a mediator, would cut out pertinent accountability for war crimes and rights abuses as well as political and governance reforms questions. Consequently, this would then give Museveni and the LRA the opportunity to address only the basic needs and personal privileges and gratifications of the rank and file of the fighters with incentive for money, houses, ranks in the UPDF and amnesty from criminal prosecutions. Under such disguised surrender terms, Museveni and the UPDF are shielded from exposure and accounting for their own counter-insurgency strategies that harmed more than vindicated human rights of non-combatants in eastern and northern Uganda. This is precisely why mato oput or traditional justice is more acceptable to Museveni, not because he has recently had a revelation of and conversion to a newer and conciliatory self; but rather, he dreads the double-edged sword of the ICC that could cut both ways in an adversarial trial, testimony and cross examination of evidence and witnesses.
Juba remains the best hope for a semblance of a just peace
On balance, the prospect of a Museveni-Kony deal outside of the Juba Talks does not bode well for long term peace and stability for Uganda and particularly the eastern and northern communities. First, the need for peace, the conditions and mechanisms necessary for a comprehensive settlement and durable peace will have not been addressed at all. In other words, the plight and needs of the people in concentration camps at the centre of the Juba Talks will have been displaced by the needs of the LRA fighters and Museveni’s self-interested calculations as the impetus for ending the conflict. Second, the LRA fighters would be reintegrated into these societies and many others absorbed into the UPDF and deployed in eastern and northern Uganda.
Such a course would forever make demobilised LRA combatants grateful and beholden to Museveni personally, and only too eager and willing to do his biddings. Fears for such prospects are not borne out of unfounded cynicisms but concrete experiences. Witness the pro-Museveni overzealousness of former UPDM/A commanders such as Col. Walter Ochora and Col. Otema Awany; the exploits of Maj. Okot Wiilit and Maj. Fearless Obwoya; and the activities of former LRA honchos Brig. Kenneth Banaya, Brig. Sam Kolo, Maj. Ray Apire, and Col. Onen Kamdulu, to mention but a few. It did not bother anyone in Uganda, and internationally, that this latter group returned from the bushes and kept as wives, girls they abducted, raped and used as sex slaves.
Furthermore, a person like Brig. Banya, Brig. Kolo, and Maj. Apire are the original LRA. As officers and commanders, they should be more responsible for alleged abduction, extrajudicial execution and destruction in northern Uganda. But since their return and willingness to serve Museveni's whims, they are shielded and the ICC not bothered about them. This is despite the fact that while these three were not abducted but are former soldiers and adults who joined the LRA willingly, the other commanders such as Raska Lukwiya and Dominic Ongwen, who have been indicted by the ICC, were abducted as children and trained by the Banyas and Kolos in the trade they now stand accused of.
For those interested in a negotiated settlement and a just peace through the success of the Juba Talks, there is need to understand the objective history of the war (Accord, No. 11, 2002) and not let the methods of the LRM/A insurgency and its alleged brutalities dim our own memory of the war or cloud our judgements on how best durable peace can be achieved. No doubt, there are enough evidence of atrocities on both sides to warrant summary, public executions of the highest ranking leaders and their generals on both sides. But what is needed now is a mechanism to bring the war and the suffering of the eastern and northern population to an end. This implies that, the Juba Talks, rather than some sideshow in Garamba, is the best framework and prospects for comprehensive ceasefire and the road to peace. Culpability for atrocities should be left to the next stage of the process, which must necessarily envisage addressing the inadequacy of the ICC indictments, and the preference for a UN Special Tribunal for Northern Uganda, to investigate and try all perpetrators guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity over the entire history of the war from 1986.
As a meaningful way forward, and for a sustainable peace afterwards, the Juba Talks must also suppose the setting up of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Anything short of an honest, just and equitable peace and settlement, will only act as a temporary band aid measure that is bound to rapture with irreparable consequences. There should be no shortcuts. And in keeping with our moral quest for a just and equitable peace, we must avoid falling prey to making a moral distinction between atrocities committed by non-state parties and that perpetrated by the state. Neither public tears of remorse nor wrapping oneself in the national flag should obstruct our perception and even-handed judgment of criminal acts and responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in northern Uganda.
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